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In Defense of Alain Badiou 
Abstract 
In lieu of an abstract, here are the article's first two paragraphs: 
In Issue 107, Philosophy Now published James Alexander’s ‘A Refutation of Snails by Roast Beef', an 
article decrying con temporary French philosopher Alain Badiou (b.l937). Alexander’s jumping-off point 
was Roger Scruton’s unfavorable review of Badiou’s The Adventure of French Philosophy (2012). He 
acknowledges that Scruton “obviously dislikes everything Badiou stands for” but takes Scruton to task for 
being too polite; he writes that “Badiou deserves derision.” A few sentences later, he claims that “a lot of 
Badiou is rubbish. There is nothing to Badiou be done with it except laugh.” Not even Badiou’s students 
escape Alexander’s comments: he scoffs that instead of taking notes in Badiou’s lectures, surely the 
students “just stand and cheer.” 
Although I might get much enjoyment from indulging in a similarly dismissive attitude toward Alexander’s 
largely ad hominem attacks against Badiou, I have chosen a different path in defending him. I honor the 
dialectical process of Socrates’ philosophical approach; therefore I offer a counterargument to expose the 
inaccuracy of Alexander’s underestimation of Badiou. I will not advance uninformed opinions based on 
insufficient familiarity (Alexander confesses a lack of knowledge of Badiou’s oeuvre). Instead, I offer a 
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In Defense of Alain Badiou
Robert Michael Ruehl describes new political possibilities.
I
n Issue 107, Philosophy Now published James Alexander’s ‘A 
Refutation of Snails by Roast BeeP, an article decrying con 
temporary French philosopher Alain Badiou (b.l937). 
Alexander’s jumping-off point was Roger Scruton’s 
unfavorable review of Badiou’s The Adventure of 
French Philosophy (2012). He acknowledges 
that Scruton “obviously dislikes everything 
Badiou stands for” but takes Scruton to 
task for being too polite; he writes that 
“Badiou deserves derision.” A few sen­
tences later, he claims that “a lot of ^jgjp
Badiou is rubbish. There is nothing to Badiou 
be done with it except laugh.” Not 
even Badiou’s students escape Alexan­
der’s comments: he scoffs that instead of 
taking notes in Badiou’s lectures, surely 
the smdents “just stand and cheer.”
Although I might get much enjoyment 
from indulging in a similarly dismissive attitude 
toward Alexander’s largely ad hominem attacks against 
Badiou, I have chosen a different path in defending him. I 
honor the dialectical process of Socrates’ philosophical 
approach; therefore I offer a counterargument to expose the 
inaccuracy of Alexander’s underestimation of Badiou. I will not 
advance tminformed opinions based on insufficient familiarity 
(Alexander confesses a lack of knowledge of Badiou’s oeuvre). 
Instead, I offer a perspective based on an engagement with and 
a deep reverence for Badiou’s philosophy.
To formulate my counterposition, I’ll comment on Badiou’s 
communist orientation and its connection with his philosophy. 
This will lead to a description of important themes in Badiou’s 
writings: new possibilities, mathematics as ontology (or the 
study of being), and set tbeory’s assistance in justifying revolt. I 
come out at tbe opposite end of the spectrum from Alexander: 
instead of wanting to silence Badiou, I am convinced that 
Badiou’s work is important to philosophy. I understand Badiou’s 
position about philosophy to be in accord with the labor 
depicted in Plato’s Allegory Of The Cave - that is, instead of its 
political neutrality tacitly condoning the intellectual shackling 
of people, philosophy is intended to help liberate people from 
the unthinking orientations and consequent degradation ubiq­
uitously present in everyday life. So I take Badiou at his word 
when he identifies himself as a modern-day Platonist.
Badiou's Readability & Relevance
I’ll start by turning to a particular problem in Alexander’s 
depiction of Badiou. He derisively says it is inexplicable why 
anybody would want to read Badiou. However, in the first year 
of its publication in France, readers purchased twenty thou­
sand copies of his Being and Event (2001). Badiou has also been 
respected internationally for some time. Being and Event, for 
example, has been published in French, Portuguese, Italian,
Spanish, German, and English. Furthermore, in Badiou and Pol­
itics (2011), Bruno Bosteels, a leading scholar of Badiou’s work, 
writes that in the 90s, “Badiou’s work, which was barely ‘dis­
covered’ by English-language readers, had been a 
familiar reference for many radical intellectuals 
and militants in Latin America and Spain - 
from the Basque country... all the way to 
Mexico and the Southern Cone” (pp.xiii- 
xiv). In fact, Badiou’s books had made their 
way into Spanish by the early 90s, into 
Italian by the mid-90s, and into German 
by 2001. These facts reveal that Badiou’s 
philosophy is not purely academic: that 
his writings are accessible. They have also 
been relevant for political analyses through­
out Latin America. Intellectuals, therefore, 
should not dismiss Badiou’s philosophy so 
easily: ad hominem attacks and shallow readings of 
his work obscure the rigor, relevance, and radicalness
of Badiou’s work. Today’s growing refusal to accept eco­
nomic inequality, police brutality, and racism require a new 
way of seeing, thinking, and acting; our times demand a philos­
ophy engaged with the reality of protesters who have taken to 
the streets to confront injustices.
Badiou's Politics
Badiou does not seek to conceal the connection he makes 
between philosophy and politics. Debates over his allegiances 
rage even as he identifies himself politically as a Marxist 
remaining faithful to the idea of communism. There is little 
doubt that his Marxist connection, Maoist leanings, and use of 
‘communism’ offend some people. Before taking offense, how­
ever, it is important to understand Badiou’s position. In an 
interview with Filippo Del Lucchese and Jason Smith, Badiou 
defines his communist orientation as follows:
“I don’t think it is absolutely necessary to keep the word communism. But I 
like this word a lot. I like it because it designates the general idea of a soci­
ety and of a world in which the principle of equality is dominant, a world 
no longer structured by classical social relations - those of wealth, the divi­
sion of labor, segregation, persecution by the state, sexual difference, and 
so on. That is, for me, what communism is. Communism in the generic 
sense simply means that everyone is equal to everyone else within the mul­
tiplicity and diversity of social functions... There is no reason why a street 
sweeper should be hounded by the state and poorly paid while intellectuals 
in their libraries are honored and at peace - and generally well paid. It’s 
absurd. What I call communism is the end of this absurdity... It’s in this 
sense that I am a communist” (‘We Need a Popular Discipline’, 2007).
To be charitable to his intellectual approach, it is important 
to understand this political view.
Badiou decidedly aligns philosophy with revolutionary
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change and disobedience. With Socratic allusions, Badiou 
writes in Philosophy for Militants (2012);
“‘To corrupt the youth’ is, after all, a very apt name to designate the philo­
sophical act, provided that we understand the meaning of‘corruption.’ To 
corrupt here means to teach the possibility of refusing all blind submission 
to established opinions. To corrupt means to give the youth certain means 
to change their opinion with regard to social norms, to substitute debate 
and rational critique for imitation and approval, and even, if the question is 
a matter of principle, to substitute revolt for obedience” (p.lO).
As a liberation thinker,
Badiou defines emancipatory 
politics as an aspect of philoso­
phy, so that philosophy is actu­
ally part of a ‘logical revolt’ 
that aims to understand and 
express clearly the new possi­
bilities resistance discloses and 
nurtures. Philosophy aids 
resistance by helping readers 
to reflect on political struggles, 
so they can be righdy disobe­
dient and change the world. It 
is easy to see how close Badiou 
seems to be to Karl Marx through Marx’s comment in his 
‘Eleventh Thesis On Feuerbach’ {Theses on Feuerbach, 1888): 
“Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in vari­
ous ways; the point however, is to change it.” Badiou also 
desires to change the world.
As part of his engagement with political change, Badiou’s 
philosophy emphasizes the theme of ‘new possibilities’ - a 
theme in distinct opposition to contemporary capitalism’s new­
ness and novelty for the sake of titillation, and profit. For 
Badiou, capitalist newness is in fact repetition: it is the status 
quo for people who live only to consume addictively. Contrary 
to this, he seeks “possibilities yet to come.” Within the pre­
dictable structure of everyday life, such new possibilities 
appear to be impossible, so Badiou welcomes tbe unforeseen 
that disrupts what is decreed as feasible. However, these appar­
ent impossibilities - or unforeseeable possibilities according to 
established expectations - do not come into tbe situation from 
beyond: new possibilities emerge from within the situation and 
its ideas about what counts, what is possible, and what is 
acceptable. In this way, new possibilities are ‘immanent inter­
ventions’ disturbing the status quo and accepted knowledge.
Concerning the importance of the transformational poten­
tials within every situation, Badiou writes, “It is a matter of 
showing how the space of the possible is larger than the one we 
are assigned - that something else is possible” {Ethics, 2013, 
p. 115). New possibilities have disrupted domination and oppres­
sion in the past, and will do so again. The large-scale destructive 
processes that maintain the so-called ‘smooth functioning’ of 
capitalism are not inevitable, and Francis Fukuyama’s idea that 
with modern capitalist democracies we have reached the ‘End 
of History’ is a misbegotten concept: the suppressive con­
straints that constitute our lives have nothing to do with his­
tory in Badiou’s sense. Instead, Badiou associates history with
ruptures within the status quo. Protests, riots, and the emer­
gence of politics (which is not to be confused with politicking) 
are integral parts of history’s coming-to-be. This is why 
Badiou writes about the ‘Rebirth of History’: “I therefore pro­
pose to say that we find ourselves in a time of riots wherein a 
rebirth of History, as opposed to the pure and simple repeti­
tion of the worst, is signalled to take shape” {fhe Rebirth of His­
tory, 2012, p.5). Protests and riots may lead to a mass thinking 
that imites people degraded by the continuous plunderings of a 
global capitalism cloaked in ‘democracy’ - an alliance Badiou 
calls ‘capitalo-parliamentarianism’. When people have had
enough, take to the streets, and 
unite with each other in ways 
that go beyond geographical 
space and parochial interests, this 
is the emergence of a process in 
which history is reborn. People 
should not forget how each situa­
tion is pregnant with possibilities 
for revolutionary change simply 
because uprisings have been 
infrequent and a capitalist 
monopoly seems inevitable. 
Badiou reminds us that despair is 
not unavoidable, since capitalist 
dominance is not predetermined. Instead, the possibilities 
latent within society should provide the oppressed with glints 
of hope. Throughout his philosophy Badiou remains faithful 
to the transformative potential, and the conviction that things 
can be different from what they are.
Badiou's Ontology
Ontology is the study and categorization of what types of 
things exist. Against more traditional evaluations of it, Badiou 
argues that ontology is not an area of philosophical specializa­
tion; he argues that mathematicians specialize in ontological 
thought without knowing so, and philosophers are left to explain 
the radical implications of the mathematicians’ thinking.
Badiou examines the mathematical developments of set 
theory found in the work of Georg Cantor, Ernst Zermelo, 
Abraham Fraenkel, and Paul Cohen, and integrates them into 
his own philosophical system. He argues that set theory shows 
that there is no transcendent unity to the world - no ‘transcen­
dent oneness’ - nor is there a unity in the material realm.
Rather, all declared oneness is the result of a ‘count-as-one’ 
operation that collects ‘multiplicities’ into an apparendy coher­
ent whole by collecting them together into sets. However, this 
wholeness only comes after the multiplicities have presented 
themselves to us. Before the artificial imposition of oneness 
occurs, what exists are multiplicities within other multipficities.
A minimal insight from set theory is therefore that some 
things belong and some do not belong because of particular 
grouping processes; also, through the particular logics of the 
grouping processes, some things are re-presented or recounted 
- given added or different significance. Before people begin to 
name, collect, and include or exclude certain things in the world 
around them, the unnamed, uncollected aspects are what Badiou 
calls ‘inconsistent multiplicities’; and after the multiplicities have
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been grouped, named, and given various levels of importance, 
they become ‘consistent multiplicities’ {Being and Event, p.23- 
30). Within the activity of collecting together and making things 
‘one’, however, certain aspects are always overlooked; there are 
always ‘inexistent’ aspects within the count that have the poten­
tial to disrupt or destabilize the categorizations generated 
through the count-as-one operation.
Although this mathematics-based analysis of reality may 
seem a little abstract to provide intellectual support for radical 
change, the opposite is the case. It provides Badiou with a way 
of understanding the unforeseen emergences of new possibili­
ties into human contexts.
This is how it works. The counting and recounting 
processes create situations where things have different levels of 
significance, or ‘intensities of existence’ as Badiou calls them. 
Badiou is concerned with how something new can emerge 
from these processes. Because no counting process can add up 
and constrain every multiplicity, uncounted multiplicities will 
always exist to threaten the stability of any situation. What he 
calls an ‘event’ is the fleeting emergence of what was previ­
ously a minimally existent aspect within a simation, revealing 
some new possibility. Once this happens and people located 
near the site of the rupture see what Badiou describes as the 
‘lighming flash’ of an event, they may become faithful ‘sub­
jects’ to it. Thus, an ‘Idea’ (the capital ‘I’ signifies its potential 
political importance) may slowly take shape and unite those 
people who are seized by the event (those become faithful sub­
jects who are part of a ‘truth process’).
Badiou undermines various traditional philosophical inter­
pretations of truth, such as the idea that truth is a correspon­
dence between words and things. For instance, in a lecture on 
the European Graduate School’s website called ‘The Event of
Truth’, Badiou says that truth is not “a relation of appropriate­
ness between the intellect and the thing intellected, a relation 
of adequation which always supposes... that the truth be local- 
izable in the form of a proposition.” Instead, “a truth is, first of 
all, something new.” Thus Badiou describes the truth process 
in the following words:
“For the process of a truth to begin, something must happen. What there 
already is, the situation of knowledge as such, only gives us repetition. For 
a truth to afSrm its newness, there must be a supplement; this supplement 
is committed to chance. It is unpredictable, incalculable; it is beyond what 
it is. I call it an event. A truth appears in its newness because an eventful 
supplement interrupts repetition. Examples: the appearance with Aeschy­
lus of theatrical tragedy, the irruption with Galileo of mathematical 
physics, an amorous encounter which changes a whole life, or the French 
Revolution of 1792” (‘The Event of Truth’, available at egs.edu).
Serious political implications follow from his description of 
die trudi process, since not only is intellectual history associated 
with disruptions, but so is political history. Moreover, knowl­
edge, repetition, the status quo, politicking, and the simation are 
all aspects of a process of ordering, policing and constraining 
what matters and what does not. By contrast, miths, events, pol­
itics, possibilities, and egalitarian emancipation are all aspects of 
dismptive processes where the excluded or ‘inexistents’ emerge 
into the world with maximal intensity. Set theory, therefore, aids 
Badiou’s revolutionary outlook, since through its philosophical 
implications we can understand how every simation, no matter 
how stable it may appear, can always be dismpted to allow the 
oppressed to stmggle for fiberation. So although Alexander fails 
to see any justification for revolution in Badiou’s work, Badiou’s 
analysis of set theory acmaUy provides support for it.













































Furthermore, there is no need for a ‘transcendental’ (exter­
nal) justification for revolt because the justification potentially 
exists in every situation. Let me offer a thumbnail sketch of 
why this is so. The state has certain ways of thinking, and so 
ways of counting people. These lead to different degrees of 
inclusion and suppression. Those who are suppressed feel the 
burden of the state’s forced exclusions. Because of the violence 
that constrains these ‘inexistent’ people within a situation, 
a disruptive potential is present, waiting for the 
right time to burst forth - an emergence that 
will challenge and possibly overthrow the 
logic structuring their world. There is 
no reason to look outside the situation for 
revolutionary justification for this; 
the situation seems to encourage or 
even demand it. Alexander does 
not grasp this. He asks, “if there is 
only one world, and no world of 
transcendental moral principles, 
why should we do anything 
other than defend the estabfished 
order? Where does the justifica­
tion for revolution come from?”
Badiou’s answer is that the justifica­
tion is the dissatisfaction with and rejec­
tion of the continuous violence that had 
tried to keep the people now faithful to the 
Idea in their inexistent position. Their experiences 
of domination and oppression and their frustrations pro­
vide the justification for revolt. This justification is woven into 
the social fabric, its structuring logics, and its subsequent polic­
ing practices. In other words, the seeds of revolution are within 
the simation itself as the dominated and oppressed give them­
selves over to an Idea of‘egalitarian emancipation’, as Badiou 
calls it in The Communist Hypothesis (2008).
Badiou Defended & Promoted
I have highlighted several important aspects of Badiou’s phi­
losophy, showing that it is far from nonsensical and unusable. 
Instead, it courageously weds analytic and continental philoso­
phy in a way that makes many philosophers uncomfortable, 
and which has led to hostile criticisms of Badiou from both 
sides of that partisan philosophical divide. Badiou also joins 
mathematical innovations to his intellectual forebears Karl 
Marx, Jean-Paul Sartre, Louis Althusser, and Jacques Lacan. 
He weaves these traditions together in a novel, insightful way 
that offers new possibilities for philosophy.
Much of the dislike for Badiou’s work is clearly politically 
based: Badiou is a revolutionary communist intellecmal who is 
unafraid to speak openly about and challenge the capitalist 
brutality he sees around him. This debate disproves naive 
assumptions about philosophy being neutral. For Badiou, tra­
ditional political philosophy - the kind apparently practiced by 
Alexander and clearly supported by Scruton - is part of the 
policing process, decreeing what counts as philosophy and 
what does not. This tension is clearly seen in the fact that 
Badiou reveres the May 1968 revolts in France, whereas Scruton 
“realized he was on the other side” of the struggle. In other
words, the struggle over philosophy is also a political struggle.
This confrontation of perspectives should provide extra jus­
tification for why people should read a philosopher’s texts for 
themselves and not depend on others’ interpretations of them. 
To rest comfortably with Scruton’s and Alexander’s interpreta­
tions - or with mine, for that matter - is intellectual laziness. 
The tension between my position and those I am confronting 
will hopefully be enough to frustrate interested readers so 
that they wish to develop their own informed assess­
ments. Generally speaking, engage as many 
perspectives as possible, always be suspicious of 
what you are reading, and form your own 
conclusions only after much deliberation. 
Philosophy is never complete; it is 
always in the making. Read Badiou’s 
work on your own, contribute to 
this debate through your informed 
*' engagement, and do not seek to 
silence him simply because you dis­
agree with him or do not under­
stand his work. Let us avoid imitating 
those who supposedly value liberty, 
democracy, and academic freedom 
whilst simultaneously subtly advocat­
ing censoring, severe policing, and intellec­
tual subservience. Let us avoid a policing 
similar to that imposed on Socrates, who was 
fatally silenced by the state for philosophizing.
Badiou poses a challenge to ‘knowledge’ as a form of intel­
lectual policing: he makes it clear that much of what we call 
education, knowledge, and philosophy is only part of a larger 
process of constraint, conformity, and capitulation within an 
economy that seeks to reduce all things to the value of the 
dollar. I suspect that Alexander somehow recognises that 
Badiou challenges his stability within an academic environ­
ment increasingly entrenched in and loyal to capitalist rela­
tions, and that this is why he suggests that he should be 
silenced or put in the stocks. However, instead of letting phi­
losophy be commodified and used as part of a policing process 
silencing dissenters, we should ardently support Badiou’s pro­
ject and rigorously protect philosophy from those who dimin­
ish it by trying to use it as a weapon to pummel people into 
submission. Let us instead adopt Badiou’s posture, which he 
learned from Plato, and use philosophy as an aid in liberating 
people from partisan opinions and their concomitant violence, 
and not as a way to shackle them to parochial oudooks that 
lead to suppression. As Badiou informs us, “Wherever a 
human collective is working in the direction of equality, the 
conditions are met for everyone to be a philosopher” {Philoso­
phy for Militants, 2012, p.37). If Badiou gives us anything, 
therefore, it is an understanding of philosophy as a labor open 
to all in the project of egalitarian emancipation and social 
change. To this understanding of philosophy as part of a hber- 
ating process, I will remain faithful.
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